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Abstract 
 
 
“Who will guard the guardians?” is both an old and still pertinent question. This research 
in progress investigates the place of constitutional courts as guardians of fundamental laws and 
balance setters in political systems in the legal and political architecture of Romania and 
Germany. Using this rather unusual comparison, the text discusses the “political question 
doctrine” and the political involvement of these authorities. 
Keywords: constitutional courts, German Constitution, German Constitutional Court, 
Romanian constitutionalism, Romanian Constitutional Court.  
 
 
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?1 
 
 
Some think that democracy is the most fit government system of all those 
history has presented us with. Thomas Jefferson once said: “I have no fear that the 
result of our experiment will be that men may be trusted to govern themselves 
without a master.” Societies may find themselves under the spell of democracy and 
sometimes act in the name of equality and equity. Still, we need to acknowledge 
that there are problems within democratic systems, at least regarding the overrated 
abstract idea that people are all equal, fact that helps the more powerful to hide 
their capacity and sometimes to secretly grow it. The best example consists in 
the newly born post-communist democratic regimes, which under the given 
impression of acting in the name of the people, legitimized by the popular vote, 
abuse in an unscrupulous and unlimited manner of their governmental power.2 
                                                          
1
  Juvenal, Liber secundus, Satira VI, lines 347-348, in D. Junii Juvenalis Saturarum Libri 
V, Erster Band, Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1895, p. 325, apud Leonid Hurwicz, “But Who 
Will Guard the Guardians?”, in American Economic Review, 98, 3, 2008, pp. 577-585. 
2 
 Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg, Democratic Constitutional Design and 
Public Policy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 180-189.  
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When discussing democracy in an academic framework it is impossible not 
to also debate constitutions, the very core of democracy, the guardian and ensurer 
of rights and liberties. But, if democracy ensures and guards the observance of 
rights and liberties of the citizens and the constitution is the safe-guarder of 
democracy, than “who will guard the guardians”?3 Plato brought this up in his 
work The Republic and then some hundred years later Juvenal wondered again. 
Passing the theoretical framework, this paper seeks to discuss the 
placement of constitutionalism and of it’s corpus, Constitutional Courts, in a 
democratic state, with regard to fundamental principles of democracy and 
political action. A short clarification is needed; I do not think, nor intend to 
suggest a pure theoretical, sui generis approach towards fundamental laws, do 
not believe in their purity and do not hope for perfection in constitutional action. 
This is why this paper does not separate politics in practice with those in theory 
and does not try to pull a veil of ignorance over determinant features of the 
process. Regarding the approach, a comparative one is sought, in order to see 
how different states, with distinct political educations but rather similar historical 
backgrounds (if not identical in form, quite akin in substance), place themselves 
in relation to constitutionalism and where these place constitutionalism (and it’s 
entire family – Constitutional Courts, fundamental principles, key rights etc.). 
Keeping in mind that this article is not meant to be of the season, we 
cannot help but notice that the issues raised and debated are of utmost presence, 
many of them being of novelty, at least for democracy-reachers (post-
communist regimes), while the democracy-graspers (democracy-traditionalists) 
still are on a touch-and-go development pattern, learning and excogitating. This 
and the social and political struggle of Romania’s last 23 years, push us to 
analitically scope among the structural problems, here bringing in for 
examination the fundamentals of the legal system and its family. 
 
“We find ourselves under the government of a system of political institutions, 
conducing more essentially to the ends of civil and religious liberty, than any of which the 
history of former times tells us.  
We, when mounting the stage of existence, found ourselves the legal inheritors of 
these fundamental blessings.”4  
 
 “Constitutions are giant restraining orders motivated by a passion for 
avoidance”5 and are designed to prevent or, if not possible, to somehow evade 
                                                          
3 
 Plato, The Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett, E-Book produced by Sue Asscher and 
David Widger, 2008, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm, 
accessed on 10 February 2010.  
4 
 Abraham Lincoln, Lyceum Address, apud Bradley C.S. Watson (editor), Ourselves and 
Our Posterity – Essays in Constitutional Originalism, Lexington Books-Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, New York and Plymouth, 2009, p. VII.  
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some unwanted political aftermaths or judicial dangers. András Sajó states that 
constitutions are guardians against “tyranny, anarchy, paralysis, corruption and 
[...] stupidity of politicians”. Constitutionalism has made drastic changes not 
only in the way people’s rights are complied with but also in how states are 
organized, countries are led and development is pursued. The fact that Romania 
has a democratic constitution6 may be considered one of the obvious features of 
its breach from Communism. The post-communist Constitutions are documents 
that mark the birth of a nation in search of a new identity.7 Looking back upon a 
rather delicate time-frame, some would call the years when the democratic 
constitution was built, to be “the years of a failed constitutional moment”8. To 
be fair, the Romanian fundamental law has reached its purpose as a legal act, 
but it has not managed to fulfill the symbolic goal that stands at the origin of the 
civic attachment. The Euro-Atlantic integration managed to point out the 
imperfections of our constitutional system. The 2003 revision has not brought a 
too bright change, moreover, it was not marked by the most important feature in 
the amendment of a constitution, namely the conscious participation of the 
population in the process itself.9 
According to Louis Henkin, the way we see constitutionalism today is the 
result of two centuries of modern standards government, that in fact was 
sourced out of the English, American and French revolutionary demands.10 Still, 
in its evolution, be it prolific for the Western developed States, constitutionalism 
has encountered many setbacks, especially in Eastern Europe where during 
the XXth century totalitarian regimes, constitutions were used to legitimize 
anti-democratic political systems. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes used the 
symbolic power of the fundamental law, given to it by the former democratic 
regimes, under which constitutions were born. This is why constitutions under 
the Communist Party of Romania became tyrannic instruments11 and also why 
                                                                                                                                              
5  András Sajö, Limiting Government: An introduction to Constitutionalism, Central European 
University Press, Budapest, 1999, p. X. 
6 
 I consider this avowal to need further explanation. Romania had its first official Fundamental 
Law in 1866, followed by the one of 1923, both of them constructed under democratic principles 
of the age, the one of 1923 granting particular observance to human rights observance and to the 
Separation of Powers. Between 1938 and 1991, Romania was under the rule of Constitutions but 
they were not at all democratic, in fact the ones in place from 1948 to 1989 were Communist 
Fundamental Laws which had no real respect for human rights and liberties or for the principles 
of democracy. 
7 
 Raportul Comisiei Prezidenţiale de Analiză a Regimului Politic şi Constituţional din 
România, C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2009. 
8 
 Ibid.  
9 
 Ibid. 
10 
 Louis Henkin, “A new birth of Constitutionalism: genetic influences and genetic defects”, 
in Cardozo Law Review, 14, 1993, pp.535-36, apud Radu Carp, Ioan Stanomir, Limitele 
Constituţiei – Despre guvernare, politică şi cetăţenie în România, C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2008, p. 177. 
11 
 Radu Carp, Ioan Stanomir, Op. cit., p. 175. 
MATEI LADEA 
 
122
according to András Sajó, constitutional developments become completely 
relevant in 1989, with the fall of the communist regimes. He calls it a “moment 
of foundation that Constitutionalism becomes directly relevant”12. In my 
opinion this is only partially relevant, because, as Cătălin Avramescu has 
underlined in one of his lectures at the Faculty of Political Science, University 
of Bucharest, European constitutionalism was not painted in democratic colours 
at its highest level, due to the influences of communist fundamental laws under 
the new, post-communist democratic governance.13 
An analysis upon the Romanian political and constitutional regime, led by 
contemporary esteemed scholars, points out that we are in a desperate need of a 
new fundamental law, developed under the public scope and through a public 
debate (with the imperative participation of the whole nation) and not of another 
political maneuver. When talking about the 1991 Romanian Constitution we 
could say that because of the outcome of the first free elections after the 
communist demise, this document was tailored to fit the National Salvation 
Front and Ion Iliescu. 
Events all over Europe, particularly in France and Finland, have shown 
that the new situations and tendencies lead towards modelling public life into 
the process of constitutional reanalysis and reconstruction. Looking at the 
Romanian one, one may notice its eclectical nature, similar to a mosaic where 
the elements put forward in 1991 contrast to the ones brought new in 2003. The 
2004–2007 timeframe covers problems such as the poor quality of Romania’s 
democratic constitutionalism, the lack of referendum in solving constitutional 
conflicts, lack of legitimacy that constitutional authorities experience, and most 
tragically, the slightly criticizable decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
The model picked for comparison is not one for equation, but rather for 
contrast, aiming to grasp and introduce the main differences that exist between 
the Romainian constitutional system and the one of a functioning, serving-as-a-
model democracy. Analysis and characterization of a system ca not be 
conducted without integrating it into a scaled supra-structure where it would be 
compared exogenously with other systems in order to outline differences and 
features.14 The democracy model used is the German constitutional one. This 
may seem a rather radical approach but it may be supported when taking into 
account the following features: while comparing, one not always needs to find 
resemblances, particularly if one seeks to discover the breaches in- or 
disfunctionalities of a system; Germany is a well performing political system 
                                                          
12  András Sajö, Op. cit., p. XIV.  
13
  Cătălin Avramescu grounded his statement by referring at the Hungarian case, where the 
1949 communist Constitution is still in place, only being partially amended. Also, he presented 
the case of Poland, where the communist Constitution was replaced in 1997.  
14 
 James Buchanan, “The Domain of Constitutional Economics”, in Constitutional Political 
Economy, I, 1, 1990, pp. 4-5. 
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with an acknowledged Constitution and an effective Constitutional Court; it is 
an EU leading, powerful, trend-setting state, particularly on issues of political, 
economic and “rule of law” concern; from a historical point of view, both 
countries suffered under totalitarian regimes, and both had to recover; although 
the process of recovery did not follow similar paths, currently both Romania and 
Germany may call themselves reasonable EU democracies, under the rule of law. 
The nature of the distructive phenomenon that affected democratic and 
modern constitutional values of both states is rather different, on a longue durée 
perspective. While Germany suffered from a sequence of two world wars and 
an authoritarian regime in between, Romania experienced several years of 
mixed authoritarian regimes (starting 1938) and then another five decades of 
communism. While I will not argue for the harsher fate or the harder 
reconstruction, I will, however, point out that the first striking difference of the 
two processes lies in what and how they were enforced. While in the German 
case the need for re-democratization was both acute and cronic at the end of the 
Second World War and enforced militarily by an alliance of international 
forces, Romania’s process was quite the opposite, coming from within, being 
generated and carried out mostly by Romanian people themselves. A first 
relevant observation is that while Romania was left to handle her re-
democratisation and constitutional issues alone, Germany was kept under 
strategic observation, moreover it practically had a Constitution drafted by the 
Allies.15 Even if, while drafting a fundamental law in Germany “the existence of 
[...] true Government (could as well) be doubted”16, many contesting the actual 
continuous existence of a German state, the finality of the infernal Trümmerzeit 
(time of ruins) was a prolific one, concluded in political and democratic 
reconstruction, followed by economic development and social prosperity. 
Almost 70 years later, many in Europe and in the world look upon the German 
state with admiration, wondering how it did it. My hypothesis and one of the 
key ideas pushed forward during previous research, is that at the core of any 
good democracy, in the nucleus of a model state, we find a strong constitutional 
family and a constitutional corpus, with respect to all critical values. Therefore, 
in the context of the present comparison, I investigate what the German model 
has while the Romanian one does not. This article does not aim to provide 
reasons to import the German Fundamental Law, as such an idea would not be 
feasible for the Romanian state’s structures and institutions. I rather aim to 
grasp the positive features of the German case and discuss to what extent 
Romania might learn from the German experience.  
                                                          
15  Documents on the creation of the German Federal Constitution, prepared by Civil Administration 
Division Office of Military Government for Germany (US), 1 September 1949, pp. 42-50. 
16 
 Carl J. Friedrich, “Rebuilding the German Constitution, I”, in The American Political 
Science Review, XLIII, 3, 1949, p. 461. 
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The Verfassung places the basic rights on a pedestal, offering them a 
central place, constructing on them and empowering the rights with kind of a 
supreme authority above all other state elements. Further on, the fundamental 
rights are protected through a non-revision clause,17 article 1 stipulating that 
“the following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary as directly applicable law”. From a technical point of view, another 
important feature of this Fundamental Law is the detailed regulation it provides, 
granting a lot of attention to every stipulated element, not leaving anything 
equivocal or any place for ambiguity. A clear example of this supra-regulation 
is article 121 which defines what a majority is and how will the “majority of the 
Members” collocation be used. 
When it comes to the substance of the German model, it creates a federal 
social state, under the rule-of-law and a parliamentary democracy, principles 
guaranteed by the constitutional order, which in its turn is theoretically and 
physically protected by art. 20, par. 4: “all Germans shall have the right to resist 
any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order”. Regarding the reference 
made earlier about democratic constitutions being the mark of a clear break 
from a totalitarian regime, the German one took this principle further, including 
a lex lustratio which provides for the continued applicability of the 
denazification provisions in article 139. Finally, one of the most important 
aspects of the German Fundamental Law is the amendment and construction 
process, which is quite rigid, meeting the needs of any state with lack of 
democratic experience and irresponsible politicians or decision-makers. 
Moreover, their procedures almost force the people to participate in the process, 
not making it possible for ignoring the popular desire. 
One should still keep in mind that since 1949 onwards, the German Basic 
Law has been amended 52 times, a rather extraordinary number since by form and 
content it is a rigid Constitution. In the process, unlike the American proceedings, 
the Constitutional Court or other judiciaries play a small part, with the Bundestag18 
Being at the forefront of revision processes. The German Constitutional Court 
considers changes in the Fundamental Law to be alterations of the constitutional 
reality, which in fact will lead to a modification of the government practice by 
remodeling the actors’ scene of action. Constitutional amendments are rarely 
sanctioned by the Court and this happens only when absolutely necessary, like 
updating law to modern realities. In most cases, this is blocked due to the belief 
that actions of amendment hurt the fundamental order.19 
                                                          
17 
 Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, art. 20, par. (1), par. (2), art. 79, par. (3). 
18  Hans-Peter Schneider, “Herr oder Hueter des Grundgesetzes? Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 
als eigenstaendiger Akteur im Verfassungsleben”, in Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Hans-Peter Gasser, 
Thilo Marauhn, Natalino Ronzitt (eds.), Frieden in Freiheit. Peace in liberty, Paix en liberté, Nomos, 
Baden-Baden, 2008, p. 1019. 
19
  Ibid., pp. 1024-1030.  
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In the absence of law, be it written or not, democracy cannot exist, or if it 
does, there is no guarantee in place. But what guards the law, particularly the 
fundamental one? It is constitutional courts. They are guardians of constitutionalism, 
protectors of fundamental laws and insurers of liberties, laws and political 
behavior. Contested or praised, they are also courts with a short tradition all 
around the world and even a shorter one in the former communist states. 
Contemporary scholars argue that in Romania, after 1912 and with a clear 
and legal confirmation in the 1923 Constitution, “constitutional justice”20 has 
become a reality, creating a Court that somehow resembled the “classic 
American model”21, characterized by “legal conservativeness” and different 
from European models like the German one.22 
Absent during communism, the principles of a Constitutional Court were 
reestablished in 1991, with the adoption of a new Constitution. At that time, the 
Constituent Assembly established a Court on the traditional (Austrian) model of 
Hans Kelsen, characterized by its capacity to arbitrate Romanian political life 
and to act as a “negative legislator”23.According to Radu Carp and Ioan Stanomir, 
the new Constitutional Court was built on the historical background of the 
Interwar Court but has only partially risen to its original prestige. Title V of the 
1991 Constitution regulated the organization, work, prerogatives, structure and 
development of the Romanian Constitutional Court (RCC). Still, this was only a 
hybrid form of what the Court used to be during the period between the two 
World Wars, moreover, only a prototype of what it was going to become after 
199624 and after 200325. The nowadays Constitutional Court exists in accordance 
with the same Title V of the Romanian Constitution, being regulated by articles 
142-147. As the Constitution stipulates in article 146 letter (l), the Court’s full description 
of work and organization is accounted in organic Law no. 47/18 May 1992, republished 
in 2010 under the Law no. 177/3 December 2010 for the modification and 
supplementing of the Law no. 47/18 May 1992, regarding the organization and work 
of the Constitutional Court, and Governmental Emergency Ordinance no. 38/2012 
                                                          
20 
 Paul Negulescu, George Alexianu, Tratat de drept public, Casa Şcoalelor Publishing 
House, Bucharest, 1943, pp. 120-30; apud Radu Carp, Ioan Stanomir, op. cit., p. 223. 
21 
 Ibid. 
22 
 Ibid. 
23
  Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Oxford University Press, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1949, p. 268. 
24
  In 1996, a case was brought before the RCC, consisting in the petition to establish Mr. Ion 
Iliescu's legal incapacity to re-run for the Presidential elections. The Court analyzed the case by 
only contrasting the situation with the Constitutional text, reaching to the opinion that Mr. 
Iliescu's candidature was legitimate.  
25
  The 2003 constitutional revision brought new powers to the RCC, and consolidated the old 
ones. Regarding the old powers, the RCC could now take definitive decisions which are no longer 
susceptible to debate in Parliament and are generally compulsory. In what concerns the new attributes, 
the Court was able from 2003, to legitimately debate on the controversies between political actors 
and institutions, through its capacity to solve legal disputes of constitutional nature.  
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for the modification and supplementing of the Law no. 47/18 May 1992, 
regarding the organization and work of the Constitutional Court. 
The characteristics of the Court presented by the Constitution revolve 
around the principle that “the Constitutional Court shall be the guarantor for the 
supremacy of the Constitution”26. The constitutional text also regulates the 
general structure of the RCC, namely that it is composed of nine judges of 
whom three are renewed every three years. The mandate of a judge lasts nine 
years and it is not renewable. The judges are appointed by the following 
authorities: three by the Romanian Presidency, three by the Romanian Senate 
and three by the Romanian Chamber of Deputies.27 The prerogatives of this 
organism are first described in the Constitution, but are detailed in the organic 
law regulating its work and organization. The Constitution stipulates the general 
principle that the RCC decides upon the constitutionality of laws before they 
enter into force. This principle is described by Hans Kelsen on the matter of 
constitutional adjudication and debated by many constitutional law scholars. 
Furthermore, the Court may intervene for solving the legal disputes of 
constitutional nature which may emerge between public authorities. It also gives 
an advisory opinion on proposals for the state’s President suspension from 
office. According to the organic law regulating the work of the RCC, the Court 
has to confirm the results of the Presidential elections, as well as the results of a 
referendum. Also, it decides on objections upon the presumed unconstitutionality 
of laws and government ordinances already enforced. This last characteristic 
is different from the first one, concerning the review of old legislation and not 
of the new legislation elaborated by the Parliament. The practice resembles to 
the principle of constitutional review presented by Cass R. Sunstein in 
Responding to Imperfection. 
Decisions, resolutions and advisory notices given by the RCC have some 
distinct characteristics, they “shall be generally binding and effective only for 
the future”28. Another strange aspect for the Romanian legal system is invoking 
older jurisprudence of the Court as a system of recalling a “precedent”. This is 
in fact what the Romanian School of Law calls “the jurisprudence as a source of 
law”. This practice is not the same with the model applied in the common law 
system, but still holds some similarities, the RCC being able to invoke its 
precedent decisions on the same legal class. The practice is also used by persons 
petitioning the RCC, arguing their cases by invoking previous Court decisions. 
On the work and characteristics of the RCC, Radu Carp and Ioan 
Stanomir offer us a detailed presentation in their work, The Limits of the 
Constitution – On Governing, Politics and Citizenship in Romania. The authors 
explain how in 2005 this authority enters - through its actions - the nucleus of 
                                                          
26  Constituţia României, art. 142, par. (1). 
27  Ibid, art. 142, par. (2)-(5).  
28  Ibid., art. 147, par.(4). 
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political debates. Its decisions have been sometimes supported and sometimes 
considered controversial, like at the end of 2005, when through decision no. 
600/2005, it rejects a financial compensations law, acting against HM King 
Mihai I of Romania. Because of the new position it receives in the eyes of the 
public opinion and on the stage of political development, this institution 
becomes the regulator of many aspects of Romanian political life, like the 
statute of the Romanian President or the parameters of law-making processes. 
The clear confirmation of this aspect comes also at the end of 2005, and is 
materialized through decision no. 601/2005, regarding Parliamentary Chambers’ 
regulations and their unconstitutionality. This was the case of intervention 
within a political dispute, which – through the control lever of “supreme interpretor” 
of the Constitutional text –- helped the Court to reinforce its legitimacy as a 
referee of disputes on the fundamental law application and interpretation.29 
First of all this specific court has the role of a special jurisdiction. After 
1996, when it solved a constitutional conflict [concerning Ion Iliescu and his 
right to run for President], this court becomes an arbitrator of Romanian 
political life [even against its own will]. Through statue and mission, the 
Romanian Constitutional Court establishes the frame within which the political 
actors are acting. Consequently, its credibility determines the credibility of 
democracy itself. 
Looking at the other element of comparison, the German Constitutional 
Court (GCC) is considered by Erhard Blankenburg to enter the German Legal 
System as a late accomplishment of a XIXth century liberal dream.30 Although 
such a judicial body was stipulated in the Paulskirchenverfassung of 1849, until 
the end of the Weimar Republic it was not possible to established it, due to both 
the opposition of the Lands and of the Emperor, who considered matters of 
political nature should only be solved politically and not judicially.31 Nowadays, 
the unique profile of this authority has been placed under the aegis of the 
Parliament, being regulated by an Organic Law of 195132 and a secondary norm 
(dated 1975) which states the internal procedures and proceedings of the Court, 
such as situations and means to remove a judge from a specific case. 
While building the GCC, the Constituent Assembly of 1949 modeled it 
after the Austrian Constitutional Court project of 1920, adding some United 
States Supreme Court characteristics, like the possibility to revise (by relating to 
                                                          
29  Radu Carp, Ioan Stanomir, Op. cit., pp. 221-223.  
30  Erhard Blankenburg, “Changes in Political Regimes and Continuity of the Rule of Law in 
Germany”, in Herbert Jacob, (ed.), Courts, Law, and Politics in Comparative Perspective, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1996, p. 308.  
31 
 Ludger Helms, Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000, p. 84.  
32 
 Hans J. Lietymann, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Studie, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1985, pp. 30-59.  
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the Constitution) judicial decisions of lower hyerarchy courts.33 It is composed 
of two Senates, a feature unique among the universe of constitutional courts and 
a design, that has been considered by scholars as a doctrinary separation 
between judicial and political adjudication.34 A first clear division took place in 
1956 due to an unequal volume of cases that were handled by the two chambers, 
the first Senate being overwhelmed with constitutional complaints. This is why 
it was regulated for the equal division of labor, both chambers in a plennary 
session being able to redistribute some of the complaints. Again, in order to 
increase the Court’s effectiveness, in each Senate were organized three 
substructures (composed of three judges) with the purpose of classifying the 
petitions. Moreover, thirty years after their establishment, the substructures 
were further advanced a richer set of prerogatives, in order to be able to 
establish the admissibility of a petition. This means that before a complaint 
comes before the entire panel of judges, it has to be considered admissible by 
the substructure which acts like a small council and rejects different kinds of 
suits like those already decided upon.35 This system has been strongly criticized 
quoting art. 101 of the German Constitution, which guarantees the right of a just 
judgement of every case, the above described procedure in fact blocking the 
acces of individuals to a judicial resolution, through a non-judicial decision. 
Still, the Court ignores the critics, considering that the same judges would treat 
those same petitions in a similar manner if it reached the entire panel. On the 
other side, since the implementation of this design, the Court accelerated its 
processing capacity, providing solutions on a record number of complaints 
during the 1990s, a fact that encouraged citizens and state bodies to address it in 
order to solve disputes.36  
Going back to changes suffered by the GCC, all of the ammendments 
brought were meant to increase the effectiveness of the judicial process. The 
number of judges per Senate was reduced twice, first in 1956 from 12 to 10 and 
second in 1962, from 10 to 8, the current configuration. Furthermore, the 
mandate of a judge was limited to 12 years, contradicting the initial construction 
which was meant to be for life with a mandatory retirement clause at the age of 
68. Interesting is also the nature of the panel’s composition, namely a political 
one, the leading represented parties being the CDU/CSU and the SPD, with 
                                                          
33  Klaus von Beyme, “The Genesis of Constitutional Review in Parliamentary Systems”, in 
Christine Landfried (ed.), Constitutional Review and Legislation: An International Comparison, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1988, p. 34. 
34 
 Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
2nd edition, Duke University Press, Londra, 1997, p. 17.  
35
  Ludger Helms, Op. cit., p. 86. 
36 
 Erhard Blankenburg, “Die Verfassungsbeschwerde – Die Nebenbühne der Politik und 
Klagemauer von Bürgern”, Kritische Justiz, 31, 1998, p. 212. 
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exceptions made by FDP nominations.37 Recently, after many attempts, the 
Green Party also managed an appointment. Regarding appointments, comparing 
current nominations with those in the 1950s, when judges were selected from 
political and economic milieus, one may notice that nowadays there is a 
preference towards jurists and scholars.38  
Among the most significant changes in the Court’s practices since its 
establishment in 1949, it is worth mentioning the introduction of the judges’ 
possibility of issuing signed concurring or dissenting opinions unlike what 
happens in the French and Italian systems.39 The CDU opposed this provision 
in the 1951 organic law, because it did not want to risk harming the authority 
of the Court by publishing the divised positions in the panel.40 The peak of 
this prerogative was reached in 1995 when one in every five decisions had a 
concurring or dissenting opinion.41 To sum up, although during its more than 
60 years of existence, the GCC went through a lot of changes, it still has its 
1949 constitutionally-established nucleus of competences conserved, if not 
in fact enriched. 
In a comparative perspective, the German system, though different from 
common law, resembles to it in what concern the respect of the authority of the 
judicial precedent, at least at the level of the Constitutional Court. From this 
point of view, it is similar ro the Romanian system, even though in the latter this 
principle is not applied in a uniform manner. In the German instititutional 
design, once pronounced a decision will stay in place and serve as example for 
future similar cases. Officially, the stare decisis principle is not mandatory for 
ordinary courts. In fact, no court lower of the GCC uses it as a decisional 
system, except the previous resolutions of the Constitutional Court, which will 
serve as precedents both for it and lower courts. By custom, Germany also 
implemented the power of precedent on a constitutional level, the “lawyers can 
be fined for failing to invoke relevant precedents in their pleadings”.42 The fact 
that there are resemblances among the common law and German system has its 
roots in the Post-World War II period, while during the London discussions 
“emerged a series of agreed recommendations which set the pattern upon which 
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the whole of the Western German political development is based”43. Still, the 
US constitutional revision model was not fully accepted due to the German’s 
fear of judicializing the politics and politicizing the judiciary.44  
Democratic evolutions of politics brought up the concept of “governing 
with judges”, which explains that (and why) it is a generally accepted 
hypothesis for constitutional courts decisions to have political implications,45 
though one cannot assume a general politicization of these authorities. A clear 
example is how modern political history has been writen through constitutional 
courts decisions,46 a fact that determins critics to claim that these bodies tend to 
endanger the constitutionally guaranteed places of parliaments (or governments 
for that matter) in democratic states.47 The history of these somewhat supreme 
judicial authorities illustrates how they have taken different cases as open 
invitations to extensive adjudication, assuming new prerogatives that 
unprecedentedly extended the range of their expertise, so that nowadays one 
may witness intense arbitration of political topics. Some courts have their own 
interpretation of what articles of their constitutions represent, a fact that 
influences their decisions and creates a gap among adjudication in judicial cases 
and the one in political cases, which may trigger the interpretation that there is a 
differece between a judicial and legislative function. In this respect, Christine 
Landfried argues that it has become more and more obvious how the doctrinary 
separation of powers starts to become less and less obvious for the realities of 
European governance despite its allegedly well-established place in our minds.48  
 
“In the end, governing with judges also means governing like judges.”49 
 
The above mentioned concept sheds light upon the “political question 
doctrine” cases, of which Dieter Grimm, a former GCC judge, thinks they 
represent a manifestation of the hindrances politicians meet in their encounters 
with constitutional norms:  
 
“Politicians who enter delicate situations where constitutional norms hinder their 
plans or ruin their political agenda must not allow themselves the breach of those norms. 
Such actions tend to fasten wrong social conducts, behaviors generated by the examples of 
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political elites, elites who despite their incapacity of guaranteeing the respect of 
constitutional norms, can still create cultural models”50.  
 
While there is no excuse for unconstitutional political moves or 
aggressive attacks against fundamental norms, the actors try to justify their 
actions behind the rigid character of constitutions, considering these to create 
blockages among authorities or in relation to ambitious political projects. While 
analyzing such occurrences, one needs to keep in mind the reason of 
inflexibility of fundamental norms and start any discussion knowing that the 
nucleus of constitutions represents the protection against unconstitutional actions, 
like eroding the above named hindrances through excessive amendments.51 
After decades of modern constitutionalism one may draw several 
conclusions: constitutional courts are absolutely necessary and have to be 
(re)legitimized and under no circumstances abolished, the norms regulating 
their functions have to be redefined for completion of the tasks of guarding the 
constitution, rights and liberties of the citizens. In the case of Romania, the 
above mentioned commission observes, for example, that the method of 
selecting judges for this court was faulty until now and suggest to change it 
together with the way the relations between the public authorities are 
articulated. As the model of the Central and East European democracies has 
shown, constitutional courts need to serve as the highest instance that watches 
to the observance of the constitutional provisions, the rights and liberties of the 
people forming the state. A physical argument would be the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court which has proved from 1990 onwards to be a strong and 
relevant pillar of democracy, as well as an inspiring model, a structure which 
has also managed to generally develop in post-communist circumstances as the 
Romanian one did. 
When comparing the Romanian Constitutional Court with the German 
Court, one may identify both theoretical resemblances and practical differences, 
with a significant impact on the outcomes of their ruling. In Germany the 
Constitutional Court acts in political question cases like a ballance-setter of 
power, taking authority from Parliament and granting it to the Executive (for 
instance, for UN armed forces deployments) or vice-versa (for instance, on 
complaints concerning EU Treaties). In their development, these courts need to 
work as a secondary mechanism of protection for the state’s and citizens’ 
interests, particularly, as modern political history and contemporary events have 
shown, as guardians of rights, liberties and fundamental provisions from other 
authorities and political actors. The post-communist Romanian Constitutional 
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Court’s experience, as interpreted by most scholarship on the topic still needs to 
redefine its structure, organization and legal framework in order to exercise 
fully its role of guardian of rights and liberties, and guarantor of the 
constitution. Such changes could be made through modifications of the 
legislative framework of the Court, but even in this case the RCC would still be 
required to adjudicate in relation to the ambiguous fundamental law that 
Romanian currently has. 
For such reasons, Romanian scholars writing on this topic frequently 
support the idea of a revision of the Constitution, but their argument has been 
often abused by political actors seeking public acceptance and support. The 
2003 revision process revealed that a simple revision is not sufficient, especially 
when working with a systemically compromised structure and that there is a 
need for a reconstruction of the Romanian Constitution, with observance 
granted to core democratic principles. This larger discussion is concentrated 
upon the fact that rules tend to describe the game or system and this determines 
participants to try and construct the rules by their desires. Consequently, the 
choice of rules becomes a debate on how people choose their limitations and 
constraints. At the same time, from a political viewpoint supporting the view 
that “institutional constraints are based on individual interests”52, the 
government will be essential to any potential revisions process.  
A new Constitution has to empower citizens and place key institutions 
like the Constitutional Court outside the reach of politicians, both by changing 
the way judges are elected for the Constitutional panel and by ensuring that 
competences of this authority are not easily amendable by governmental 
emergency ordinances. As the GCC has pointed out several times in the latent 
conflict with the European Court of Justice, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz is a 
serious hindrance, where one institution must not be left with the capacity to 
establish its’ own competences, nor must it be allowed for those affected by an 
authority’s decision to strip it of its instruments or keep it under constant 
pressure. “Control is difficult”53 and any further actions need to keep in mind 
that while constructing constitutional families, democracy and popular 
sovreignity must be placed outside the reach of amending power. In short, from 
this point onwards, one should rather ask: is a legitimate power, which is able to 
limit almost any legislation, also able to limit itself?  
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